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Development Rights
DONALD H. ELLIOTT*
Many of you share Judge Breitel's position that develop-
ment rights are "disembodied abstractions of man's ingenuity
[that] float in a limbo until restored to reality by reattachment
to tangible real property."1 We talk about development rights
and the transfer of development rights (TDR), but many people
do not understand what these development rights are, why they
are important, and what their limits are. I would like to put
them into context; the use of these rights can be an important
and strong tool.
It is common for lawyers and property owners to think that
land is owned down to the middle of the earth and up to the top
of the sky and that the owner ought to be able to do anything he
wants with it. Initially, zoning imposed few restrictions on an
owner's ability to do things; fundamentally an owner started
with the right to build. Now the opposite is the case, particularly
in any urban environment.
The value of land is related to the amount and quality of
adjacent and available public investment in water, sewers, trans-
portation, streets, lights and fire stations. The value of land also
relates to what an owner is allowed to do with the land: zoning
regulations determine use of land.2 For example, if you are al-
lowed to build a one-family house on an acre, the value of that
land will differ from the value it would have if you were allowed
to build ten houses on that acre.$
Planning and preservation considerations often lead to a de-
cision to create a varied development in one zoning district.
When the tract is held by one owner, such variety is possible,
but when many owners are involved, this decision can lead to an
uncompensated taking. The transfer of development rights can
remedy this difficulty.4 For example, assume that you own
10,000 acres, are going to build a new town, and are obligated to
provide 2,000 acres of parkland and 1,000 acres of road. The
park and road requirements are not uncompensated takings be-
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cause when you sell the parcel, you can add the land cost of the
parks and of the roads to the amount of money you receive for
the rest of the property.
If, however, the land is held by multiple owners, and if the
government requires a park in the middle of the land, a different
situation is presented. Those who own the land on which the
park is going to be located will not be able to build on their
land, but those who own the land on which development is al-
lowed can build on their land. That situation would violate due
process. That is what an uncompensated taking is; and that is
why we have this fundamental issue. In any large scale develop-
ment, it is common to move the bulk around - to place a build-
ing on one place and not another - without any problems.
When there are multiple owners and a need to deal with them
fairly, the transfer of development rights becomes interesting
and useful.
In order to transfer development rights, you do not have to
own the underlying land. You can even transfer the development
rights if you have a long-term lease. There was a case where a
lessor thought he was leasing a building, but the lessee sold the
development rights from his leasehold to a person next door for
a significant sum of money.5 The lessor thought he had been in-
jured. Claiming that it was his land and that all he had leased
was the building, he went to court. The court held that the les-
sor had forgotten to retain the development rights when he
leased the land, and, since he was getting some value through his
rent, he could not recover.
The normal transfer of development rights in New York is a
simple transfer between adjacent lots. In a number of places
around town, dramatic results have been achieved through the
transfer of development rights: in lower Manhattan, across the
street from what used to be the U.S. Steel Building, there is a
little park that is the result of a transfer of development rights.
The rights to build on that piece of land were transferred across
the street to the U.S. Steel Building. The building, as a result, is
a little bigger, but open space has been retained in the City. In
that park is a one-story structure containing Chock Full o' Nuts.
U.S. Steel owned the 21-story building in which Chock Full o'
Nuts was a ground-floor lessee. Of all the lessees in the building,
only Chock Full o' Nuts remained. All the development rights,
[Vol. 1:693
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss3/21
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
less that portion attributable to Chock Full o' Nuts space, were
transferred across the street. At the conclusion of the Chock Full
o' Nuts lease, that building will be demolished. A park was cre-
ated through the creative use of this transfer technique.
From a planning point of view it may be undesirable to
treat everyone equally under zoning and to allow only similar
development on each adjacent parcel, but from a legal point of
view it is difficult to avoid treating adjacent owners equally. The
difficulty of both creating open space or preserving landmarks
and still treating owners equally is what leads to the continued
interest in development rights.
The Penn Central," Fred F. French,7 Seaman's Church In-
stitute,8 and the Lutheran Church case9 have set the perimeters
in this area. But the law is still evolving and, therefore, distinc-
tions that lawyers articulate may or may not hold up.10
Transfers of development rights, ordinarily simple convey-
ances, become more complicated when a transfer out of the im-
mediate area is involved. The Fred F. French case dealt with an
interesting application of the New York ordinance.11 The City
had designated two private parks in Tudor City as a park dis-
trict. The effect of that district was to forbid the owner from
building on those parks, but to give the owner the right to sell
the development rights arising from the parks to anyone within
the area from 38th to 60th Street and from Third to Eighth
Avenue.
The Fred F. French Company sold the entire Tudor City
complex, including the two private parks and apartment houses.
The purchaser wanted to transfer the development rights of the
two park parcels to a building that would have spanned 42nd
Street. There were those in the general New York community
who thought that building, while dramatic, might not be desira-
ble. Someone commented that he was impressed by that build-
ing, but not favorably. The Planning Commission held a hearing
on a series of alternatives and decided that the developer could
not transfer the development rights in this fashion. The devel-
oper, unable to use the property as he had anticipated, stopped
paying on the mortgages held by the seller of the land. He de-
faulted, and so the person who brought the lawsuit was the Fred
F. French Company, the seller. The Fred F. French Company, as
plaintiff, claimed that the purchaser defaulted because, in the
1981]
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view of the purchaser, the rezoning of buildable parks as solely
public parkland and the refusal to permit the use, as proposed,
of the development rights from that parkland destroyed the
value of the property.12 The case went to the Court of Appeals in
that context, and that court held that the rezoning constituted
an unreasonable use of the police power. In my view, the court
erred in looking at it as though these two private parks and the
related lots were earning no revenue at all." In fact, those two
private parks had been part of the value of Tudor City.
Judge Breitel's opinion for the Court of Appeals in Penn
Central emphasized that the rights are transferable to sites al-
ready owned by Penn Central." Judge Breitel made it clear in
both the Penn Central8 and Fred F. French" cases that the
regulations in question did not result in a taking which would
entitle the owner to just compensation. If you do not have a tak-
ing, that is, if the regulation is reasonable and does not destroy
the value of the property, the value of the property may be di-
minished dramatically. Once the court determines there is no
taking, the inquiry usually does not go any further. The develop-
ment rights, however, must retain some value and some likeli-
hood of being used or a court will find that the deprivation of
these rights is a taking. That seems to be the meaning of those
two cases.
An example of a transfer of development rights between
non-contiguous properties that has been done successfully is the
South Street Seaport. A series of banks agreed to accept a mort-
gage on development rights in place of a mortgage on the land,
allowing the land to go to the South Street Seaport and to be
used while the banks held the development rights for many
years without any return. Those development rights will soon be
able to be sold, and some value will come from them.
Difficult problems are coming up with the transfer of devel-
opment rights. If you transfer the development rights to a con-
tiguous lot, the benefit of the landmark or the open space affects
people who are hurt by the larger building. In the situation
presented by the Penn Central case, the transfer was within a
discrete area, so people in that area benefitted from the contrast
between the small and the large buildings. If you transfer the
rights to a noncontiguous location, you put the benefit of the
transfer on one group of the public, and the detriment, if there
[Vol. 1:693
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss3/21
1981] DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 697
is detriment in the larger bulk of a building, on another group.
To ameliorate that problem, an attempt has been made to limit
the amount that the receiving lot can acquire.
In spite of all the problems, transfer of development rights
provides one of the most powerful regulatory tools - one that
can be most effectively used by the private development
community.
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Public Actions to Accommodate Changes
in Property Values
JOHN C. NELSON
* J.D., 1955, New York University Law School; B.S., 1952, Lawrence College; Part-
ner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
1. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976 & Supp.
III 1979), amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470-470w-6 (West Parn. 1981).
2. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. I.R.C. §§ 167(o), 191 (1980).
4. I.R.C. §§ 167(n), 280B (1980).
5. I.R.C. §§ 167(n), 167(o), 191, 280B (1980).
6. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 205-1.0 - 207-21.0 (Williams 1976 & Supp.
1981).
7. Id. § 207-10.0.
8. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9. New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolutions, 74-79 to 74-793. See id. art. I., ch. 2, § 12-10
(defining Zoning Lot).
10. N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 8.
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* J.D., 1957, New York University Law School; Partner, Webster & Sheffield.
1. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 598, 350 N.E.2d
381, 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
2. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926).
3. The value of land in cities is also related to the permissible use of that land. One
way to determine the amount of usage permissible on a particular lot is to calculate how
much floor space can be built on a certain amount of land under the appropriate zoning
regulation. The figure which results from this calculation is expressed as the Floor Area
Ratio (FAR): if you have 100 feet of land, and if you can build one foot of building for
each foot of land, you have 1 FAR, or a Floor Area Ratio of 1. If you pay $200 a square
foot for a piece of land, and if you are allowed to build ten times as much floor area as
you have land, you pay $20 for each foot of office or apartment space. If construction
costs $40 a foot, the cost of land becomes an enormously important part of the total
costs. It is difficult, therefore, to find a piece of land with 10 FAR that is worth as much
as $200. If, however, you allow the developer to build a little more, if you allow him a 15
FAR (which is not unusual), his land cost drops from $20 per foot of building to $14,
with a dramatic multiplier effect.
4. The transfer of development rights is a useful technique not only in the cities,
particularly with respect to open space, but also in suburban and rural areas as well.
Where you have a 1,000-acre tract owned by four or five owners, if you concentrate the
development in 100 acres and keep the other 900 acres vacant, you may have a much
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better result than if you put a house on each place. There is an example in New York
City of a 110-acre golf course on the edge of Queens of which 9 acres were developed
with three large buildings and 100 acres left vacant. The alternative was to have all 110
acres covered by three-story structures.
5. Newport Assocs. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
6. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
7. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
8. In re Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314
(1st Dep't 1968).
9. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305,
359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
10. Economic conditions are important, as is the question of time. For instance, if I
were to offer development rights to a developer to use on a parcel located anywhere from
38th to 60th Street and from Third Avenue to Eighth Avenue, many people would be
willing to pay a significant sum for those rights. This is so because, assuming that no
governmental authority is interposed, such rights permit a building to be made 10%
larger at a negotiated price. For example, the Penn Central air rights have been bought
by the Phillip Morris Company.
11. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
12. The plaintiff contended that the rezoning of the parks constituted a compensa-
ble "taking." Id. at 593, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
13. The Court of Appeals found that there had been no actual taking by governmen-
tal occupation or title. Thus, the plaintiff's sole remedy was the declaration of the zoning
amendment's invalidity. Id. at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
14. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), afl'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. Id.
16. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
Development Alternatives for
Preservation by Nonprofit Organizations
MICHAEL D. BAILKIN
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1. Fanueil Hall Marketplace, Boston, Mass.
2. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §8 5301-5317 (1976
& Supp. III 1979).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (Supp. III 1979); 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.450-.466 (1981).
4. Economic Development Administration, 13 C.F.R. §§ 308.1-.51 (1981).
5. See, e.g., New York City's Industrial Commercial Incentive Board, which exempts
95% of the increase in the assessed value on the completion of an industrial project or
rehabilitation project, with a 5% decrease in the exemption each year for the next 19
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